Aquinas on passion and its object
If, therefore, we compare the passions of the irascible faculty with those concupiscible passions that denote rest in goodit is evident that in the order of execution, the irascible passions take precedence of such like passions of the concupiscible faculty: thus hope precedes joyand hence causes it, according to the Apostle Romans : "Rejoicing in hope.
And so, too, in the higher part of the soul--viz. This would normally be the act of a virtuous person.
Aquinas treatise on the passions
Therefore no passions of the same power, that are not contrary to one another, differ specifically. As they encountered difficulties in their striving to gain or to flee an object, the irascible emotions came into play. See Simo Knuuttila And so neither can anger be called a principal passion, because it arises from daring. For the Philosopher says Ethic. After all, even our bodily actions can be morally good and bad; and the passions, as St. Nevertheless, two principal themes emerge. Therefore, in the passions of the soul , there can be no other contrariety than that of good and evil. Wherefore it only follows that the irascible passions precede those concupiscible passions that connote rest. Do they make them more good or more bad? And it is therefore evident that the irascible passions both arise from and terminate in the passions of the concupiscible faculty.
This union belongs to joy or pleasure, which follows desire. ST 1a2ae, q. There is also an affective union, consisting in an aptitude or proportion, in so far as one thing, from the very fact of its having an aptitude for and an inclination to another, partakes of it: and love betokens such a union.
Because the irascible faculty is denominated from anger. This argument would proveif the formal object of the concupiscible faculty were something contrary to the arduous, just as the formal object of the irascible faculty is that which is arduous.
Therefore in the same power there are passions that differ in species without being contrary to one another. Among the scholastics it was developed in the mid s by John of La Rochelle d.
What are the passions
In like manner, nothing desires evil , as such; but all things shun it: wherefore evil cannot have the aspect of a term whereto, but only of a term wherefrom. The second division art. As to the intellective faculty, the lover is said to dwell in the beloved insofar as the lover is not content with superficial knowledge of the beloved but strives to investigate everything that intimately pertains to the beloved, and thus he enters into his very interior. The two sets of passions are therefore complementary, since the irascible passions counteract the tendency of the concupiscible passions to be repelled by obstacles to their fulfilment I am grateful to Eleonore Stump for first drawing my attention to the Gifts and other non-Aristotelian attributes of ST 2a2ae, qq. This seems a rather poor haul for a major theorist. On the contrary, The acts of the different powers differ in species ; for instance, to see, and to hear. Two of them, viz. See Aristotle, De anima, a15, in On the Soul, trans. Therefore, in the passions of the soul , there can be no other contrariety than that of good and evil. Therefore, since the passions are movements of the sensitive appetite , as stated above I-II , the passions of the irascible faculty are specifically distinct from those of the concupiscible part. Now since rest is the end of movement, it is first in the order of intention , but last in the order of execution.
Further, passions differ according to their objects; just as movements differ according to their termini. For this reason some have said that these four are the principal passionsbecause they are general passions ; and this is trueprovided that by hope and fear we understand the appetite's common tendency to desire or shun something.
I answer that, The passion of anger is peculiar in this, that it cannot have a contrary, either according to approach and withdrawal, or according to the contrariety of good and evil.
Thus no passion is contrary to anger according to contrariety of approach and withdrawal.
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